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Abstract. In an election, we are given a set of voters, each having a preference
list over a set of candidates, that are distributed on a social network. We consider
a scenario where voters may change their preference lists as a consequence of
the messages received by their neighbors in a social network. Specifically, we
consider a political campaign that spreads messages in a social network in sup-
port or against a given candidate and the spreading follows a dynamic model for
information diffusion. When a message reaches a voter, this latter changes its
preference list according to an update rule. The election control problem asks to
find a bounded set of nodes to be the starter of a political campaign in support
(constructive problem) or against (destructive problem) a given target candidate
c, in such a way that the margin of victory of c w.r.t. its most voted opponents is
maximized.
It has been shown that several variants of the problem can be solved within a con-
stant factor approximation of the optimum, which shows that controlling elections
by means of social networks is doable and constitutes a real problem for modern
democracies. Most of the literature, however, focuses on the case of single-winner
elections.
In this paper, we define the election control problem in social networks for multi-
winner elections with the aim of modeling parliamentarian elections. Differently
from the single-winner case, we show that the multi-winner election control prob-
lem is NP -hard to approximate within any factor in both constructive and de-
structive cases. We then study a relaxation of the problem where votes are ag-
gregated on the basis of parties (instead of single candidates), which is a varia-
tion of the so-called straight-party voting used in some real parliamentarian elec-
tions. We show that the latter problem remainsNP -hard but can be approximated
within a constant factor.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, social media are extensively used and have become a crucial part of our
life. Generating information and spreading in social media is one of the cheapest and
most effective ways of advertising and sharing content and opinions. People feel free to
share their opinion, information, news, or also gain something by learning or teaching
in social media; on the other hand, they also use social media to get the latest news and
information. Many people even prefer to check social media rather than news websites.
Social media are also exploited during election campaigns to support some party or
a specific candidate. Many political parties diffuse targeted messages in social media
with the aim of convincing users to vote for their candidates. Usually, these messages
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are posted by influential users and diffused on the network following a cascade effect,
also called social influence. There are shreds of evidence of control election using the
effect of social influence by spreading some pieces of information, including fake news
or misinformation [20]. The presidential election of the United States of America is
a real example. It has been shown that on average, ninety-two percent of Americans
remembered pro-Trump false news, and twenty-three percent of them remembered the
pro-Clinton fake news [1]. There are more real-life examples that have been presented
in the literature [3,15,18,23].
This motivated the study of election control problems in social networks by using
dynamic models for influence diffusion. We are given a social network of voters, a set
of candidates, and a dynamic model for diffusion of information that models the spread
of messages produced by political campaigns. The problem asks to find a bounded set
of voters/nodes to be the starter of a political campaign in support of a given target can-
didate c, in such a way that the margin of victory of c w.r.t. its opponents is maximized.
Each voter has its own preference list over the candidates and the winner of an elec-
tion is determined by aggregating all preference lists according to some specific voting
rule. Voters are autonomous, however their opinions about the candidates, and hence
their preference lists, may change as a consequence of messages received by neighbors.
When a message generated by a political campaign reaches a node, this latter changes
its preference list according to some specific update rule. When the campaign aims to
make the target candidate win, we refer to the constructive problem, while when the aim
is to make c lose, we refer to the destructive problem. This problem recently received
some attention (see the next paragraph). Most of the works in the area, however, focus
on single-winner voting systems, while several scenarios require voting systems with
multiple winners, e.g., parliamentarian elections.
In this paper, we consider the problem of multi-winner election control via social
influence, where there are some parties, each with multiple candidates, and we want to
find at most B nodes to spread a piece of news in the social network in such a way
that a target party elects a large number of its candidates. In this model, more than one
candidate will be elected as the winner, and parties try to maximize some function of the
number of winners from their party. We considered this problem for some well-known
objective functions in both constructive and destructive cases.
Related Work. There is an extensive literature about manipulation or control of elec-
tions, we refer to the survey in [13] for relevant work on election control without the
use of social networks. In the following, we focus on election control problems where
the voters are the nodes of a social network, which recently received some attention.
Finding strategies to maximize the spread of influence in a network is one of the
main topics in network analysis. Given a network and a dynamic model for the diffu-
sion of influence, find a bounded set of nodes to be the starters of a dynamic process
of influence spread in such a way that the number of eventually influenced users is
maximized. The problem, known as Influence Maximization (IM), has been introduced
by Domingos and Richardson [11,21] and formalized by Kempe et al., who gave a
(1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm [17] for two of the most used dynamic models,
namely Independent Cascade Model (ICM) and Linear Threshold Model (LTM). We
point the reader to the book by Chen et al. [8] and to [17].
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Wilder and Vorobeychik [24] started the study of election control by means of IM.
They defined an optimization problem that combines IM and election control called
election control through influence maximization that is defined as follows. We are given
a set of candidates, a social network of voters, each having a preference list over the
candidates, a budget B, and a specific target candidate c⋆. The network allows the dif-
fusing influence of individuals according to ICM. When a node/voter v is influenced,
it changes its preference list in such a way that the rank of c⋆ in the preference list of
v is promoted (constructive) or demoted (destructive) by one position. At the end of a
diffusion process, the voters elect a candidate according to the plurality rule [25]. The
problem asks to find a set of at most B nodes to start a diffusion process in such a way
that the chances for c⋆ to win (constructive) or lose (destructive) at the end of the diffu-
sion are maximized. Wilder and Vorobeychik used the Margin of Victory (MoV) as an
objective function and showed that there exists a greedy algorithm that approximates
an optimal solution by a factor 1/3(1 − 1/e) for constructive and 1/2(1 − 1/e) for
the destructive case. The same problem has been extended to LTM and general scoring
rules [25] by Coro` et al. [9,10]. They have shown that the problem can be approxi-
mated within the same bound. A similar problem has been studied in [12]. The authors
consider a network where each node is a set of voters with the same preference list,
and edges connect nodes whose preference lists differ by the ordering of a single pair
of adjacent candidates. They use a variant of LTM for influence diffusion and show
that the problem of making a specific candidate win is NP-hard and fixed-parameter
tractable w.r.t. the number of candidates. Bredereck and Elkind [5] considered the fol-
lowing election control problem. Given a network where the influence spread according
to a variant of LTM in which each node has a fixed threshold, and all edges have the
same weight, find an optimal way of bribing nodes or add/delete edges in order to
make the majority of nodes to vote for a target candidate. A different line of research
investigates a model in which each voter is associated with a preference list over the
candidates, and it updates its list according to the majority of opinions of its neighbors
in the network [2,4,6]. All the previous works on election control through IM consider
single-winner voting systems. Multi-winner voting systems raised recent and challeng-
ing research trends, we refer to a recent book chapter [14] and references therein.
Our results. We introduce the multi-winner election control problem via social influ-
ence and show that it is NP-hard to approximate within any factor α > 0, for two
common objective functions known as margin of victory and difference of winners us-
ing a general scoring rule. This is in contrast with the previous work on single-winner
election control through IM, in which it is possible to approximate the optimum within
a constant factor. The hardness results hold for both constructive and destructive cases.
Given the hardness result, we focus on a relaxed version of the problem, which is a
variation of straight-party voting. We show that this latter remains NP -hard but admits
a constant factor approximation algorithm for both constructive and destructive cases.
2 Multi-winner Election Control
In this section, we introduce the multi-winner election control problem. We consider
elections with k winners and general scoring rule as a voting system, which includes
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many well-known scoring rules, such as plurality, approval, Borda, and veto [25]. We
first introduce the models that we use for diffusion of influence and for updating the
preference list of voters. Then we introduce the objective functions for the election
control problem in both constructive and destructive cases.
Model for influence diffusion. We use the Independent Cascade Model (ICM) for in-
fluence diffusion [17]. In this model, we are given a directed graph G = (V,E), where
each edge (u, v) ∈ E has a weight buv ∈ [0, 1]. The influence starts with a set of seed
nodes S and keeps activating the nodes in at most |V | discrete steps. In the first step, all
the seed nodes S become active. In the next steps i > 1, all the nodes that were active
in step i− 1 remain active, moreover, each node u that became active at step i− 1 tries
to activate its outgoing neighbors at step i with probability buv , for each node v ∈ Nou .
An active node will try to activate its outgoing neighbors independently and only once.
The process stops when no new node becomes active. We denote byAS the set of nodes
that are eventually active by the diffusion started by the seeds S.
Model for multi-winner election control. We consider a multi-winner election in which
k candidates will be elected. LetG = (V,E) be a directed social graph, where the nodes
are the voters in the election, and the edges represent social relationships among users.
The voters influence each other the same as ICM. We consider t partiesC1, C2, . . . , Ct,
each having k candidates, Ci = {ci1, c
i
2, . . . , c
i
k}, 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Without loss of generality,
we assume that C1 is the target party. The set of all candidates is denoted by C, i.e.
C =
⋃t
i=1 Ci. Each voter v ∈ V has a preference list πv over the candidates. For each
c ∈ C, we denote by πv(c) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , tk} the rank (or position) of the candidate c in
the preference list of node v.
Given a budget B, we want to select a set of B seed nodes that maximizes the
number of candidates in C1 who win the election after a political campaign that spread
according to ICM starting from nodes S (see next section for a formal definition of the
objective functions). 1
After S, nodes in AS will change the positions of candidates in C1 in their prefer-
ences list. In contrast, nodes not in AS will maintain their original preference list. The
update rule for active nodes depends on the position of the target candidates and the
goal of the campaign, i.e., if it is a constructive or a destructive one. We denote the pref-
erence list of node v after the process by π˜v . If v 6∈ AS , then π˜v = πv . In the following,
we focus on nodes v ∈ AS .
In the constructive case, like in the model in [24], the position of the target candi-
dates in the list of active nodes will be decreased by one, if there is at least one opponent
candidate in a smaller rank. The candidates who are overtaken will be demoted by the
number of target candidates that were just after them. Formally, in the constructive case,
the position of the candidates after the diffusion starting from seed S will change as fol-
lows. For each node v ∈ AS and for each target candidate c ∈ C1, the new position of
c in v is
π˜v(c)=
{
πv(c)− 1 if ∃ c′ ∈ C \ C1 s.t. πv(c′) < πv(c)
πv(c) otherwise,
1 In the remainder of the paper, by after S, we mean after the diffusion process started from the
set of seed nodes S.
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while, for each opponent candidate c ∈ C \ C1, if there exists a candidate c′ ∈ C1 s.t.
πv(c
′) = πv(c) + 1 we have π˜v(c) = πv(c) + |{c′′ ∈ C1 | πv(c′′) > πv(c) ∧ (∄ c¯ ∈
C \ C1 : πv(c) < πv(c¯) < πv(c
′′)})| , otherwise, we set π˜v(c) = πv(c).
In the destructive case, we want to reduce the number of winners in C1 and then
each node v ∈ AS increases their position by one, if it is possible. Formally, after S the
preferences list of the candidates will change as follows. For each node v ∈ AS and for
each target candidate c ∈ C1, the new position of c in v is
π˜v(c)=
{
πv(c) + 1 if ∃ c
′ ∈ C \ C1 s.t. πv(c
′) > πv(c)
πv(c) otherwise,
while for c ∈ C \C1, if there exists a candidate c′ ∈ C1 s.t. πv(c′) = πv(c)−1 we have
π˜v(c) = πv(c) − |{c′′ ∈ C1 | πv(c′′) < πv(c) ∧ (∄ c¯ ∈ C \ C1 : πv(c′′) < πv(c¯) <
πv(c)})| , otherwise, we set π˜v(c) = πv(c).
As an example, if there are two parties with three candidates each, and the initial
preferences list of a node is (c21, c
1
1, c
1
2, c
2
2, c
1
3, c
2
3), then if the node becomes active its
preferences list in the constructive case will be (c11, c
1
2, c
2
1, c
1
3, c
2
2, c
2
3), i.e., all of the
candidates c1i will promote, and all the overtaken candidates will demote; while in the
destructive case, it will be (c21, c
2
2, c
1
1, c
1
2, c
2
3, c
1
3), and all of the candidates in our target
party demote, and all the overtaken candidates will promote.
The above rule for updating the preference lists is commonly used in the litera-
ture [9,24]. In this model, we consider just one message, which contains some posi-
tive/negative information about the target party that will affect all the target candidates.
We consider a non-increasing scoring function f(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ |C|, such that for
all j > i > 0 we have f(j) ≤ f(i). A candidate c ∈ C gets f(πv(c)) and f(π˜v(c))
points from voter v before and after a diffusion, respectively. In other words, each voter
will reveal his preferences list, and each candidate will get some score according to his
position in the list and the scoring function. Also, we assume w.l.o.g. that there exist
1 ≤ i < j ≤ |C| such that f(i) > f(j), i.e., the function does not return a fixed number
for all ranks. The score of a candidate c is the sum of the scores received by all voters.
The k candidates with the highest score will be elected.
We denote by F(c, S) the expected overall score received by candidate c after S,
formally, F(c, S) = EAS
[∑
v∈V f(π˜v(c))
]
and F(c, ∅) =
∑
v∈V f(πv(c)).
Objective Functions. The objective function for the constructive election control prob-
lem in the single-winner case is maximizing the margin of victory (MoV) defined
in [24]. Let us consider the difference between the votes for the target candidate and
those for the most voted opponent candidate. MoV is the change of this value after S.
Note that the most voted opponent before and after S might change. The notion of MoV
captures the goal of a candidate to have the largest margin in terms of votes w.r.t. any
other candidate. We extend the above definition of MoV in the case of multi-winner
election control. Since the main goal is to elect more candidates from the target party,
then we define the objective function in terms of the number of winning candidates in
our target party before and after S.
Given a set AS of nodes that are active at the end of a diffusion process started
from S, we denote by FAS(c) the score that a candidate c ∈ C receives if the activated
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nodes are AS , and by YAS (c) the number of candidates that have less score than the
candidate c. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that cji has priority over c
j′
i′ if j < j
′,
or j = j′ and i < i′. In particular, the target candidates have priority over opponents
when they have the same score. Then, for each cji ∈ C, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, j ∈ {1, . . . , t},
YAS (c
j
i , S) is defined as YAS (c
j
i ) =
∣∣∣{cj′i′ ∈ C | FAS(cji ) > FAS(cj′i′ ) ∨ (FAS (cji ) =
FAS (c
j′
i′ ) ∧ (j < j
′ ∨ (j = j′ ∧ i < i′))}
∣∣∣.
For a party Ci, we define F(Ci, S) as the expected number of candidates in Ci that
win the election after S; formally,
F(Ci, S) = EAS
[∑
c∈Ci
1YAS (c)≥(t−1)k
]
. (1)
We denote by CB and C
S
A
the opponent party with the highest number of winners
before and after S, respectively. For the constructive case, themargin of victory (MoVc)
for party C1, w.r.t. seeds S, is defined as follows:
MoVc(C1, S) = F(C1, S)−F(C
S
A
, S)− (F(C1, ∅)−F(CB, ∅)) ,
while for the destructive case, it is defined as:
MoVd(C1, S) = F(C1, ∅)−F(CB, ∅)−
(
F(C1, S)−F(C
S
A
, S)
)
.
The Constructive (Destructive, resp.) Multi-winner Election Control problem (CMEC
(DMEC, resp.)) asks to find a set S of B seed nodes that maximizes MoVc(C1, S)
(MoVd(C1, S), resp), where B ∈ N is a given budget.
In some scenarios, it is enough to maximize the difference between the number of
our target candidates who win the election before and after S; we call this objective
function the difference of winners (DoW), and for the constructive case we define it as
follows:
DoWc(C1, S) = F(C1, S)−F(C1, ∅).
While for the destructive model it is defined as:
DoWd(C1, S) = F(C1, ∅)−F(C1, S).
The problems of finding a set of at mostB seed nodes that maximize DoWc and DoWd,
for a given integer B, are called Constructive Difference of Winners (CDW) and De-
structive Difference of Winners (DDW), respectively.
3 Hardness Results
In this section, we show the hardness of approximation results for the problems defined
in the previous section. We first focus on the constructive case and prove that CMEC
and CDW are NP-hard to approximate within any approximation factor α > 0. Then,
we show that the same results hold for DMEC and DDW. All the results hold even
when the instance is deterministic (i.e. buv = 1, for each (u, v) ∈ E) and when t = 3
and k = 2. Note that for t = 1 the problem is trivial and for k = 1 the problem reduces
to the single-winner case.
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Constructive Election Control. We first give an intuition of the hardness of approxima-
tion proof, which is formally given in Theorem 1. Consider an instance of the construc-
tive case in which t = k = 2, C1 = {c
1
1, c
1
2}, C2 = {c
2
1, c
2
2}, and C = C1 ∪ C2. The
weight of all edges are equal to 1, that is, the diffusion is a deterministic process. Also,
assume the scoring rule is plurality, i.e., f(1) = 1, f(2) = f(3) = f(4) = 0. Moreover,
the nodes are partitioned into two sets of equal size, V1 and V2. In the preferences lists
of all nodes in V1, candidate c
2
1 is in the first position and c
1
1 is in the second position,
while in the preferences lists of nodes in V2, candidate c
2
2 is in first position and c
1
2 is in
second position. In this instance, initially party C1 does not have any elected candidate,
that is, F(c11, ∅) = F(c
1
2, ∅) = 0, F(c
2
1, ∅) = |V1|, F(c
2
2, ∅) = |V2|, F(C1, ∅) = 0, and
F(C2, ∅) = 2.
Consider a diffusion process starting from seeds S that activate nodes AS (note
that, since the weights are all equal to 1, AS is a deterministic set for any fixed S).
The number of candidates that receives fewer votes than a target candidate c1i after the
diffusion process is YAS (c
1
i ) =
∣∣∣{cj′i′ ∈ C | FAS (c1i ) > FAS(cj′i′ ) ∨ (FAS(c1i ) =
FAS (c
j′
i′ ) ∧ (j
′ = 2 ∨ i < i′))}
∣∣∣.
Let us consider the case i = 1 and analyze the conditions that a seed set S must
satisfy in order to include a candidate in the above set, i.e., make c11 win. We analyze
the three other candidates cj
′
i′ separately.
– If j′ = 2 and i′ = 1, then we must haveFAS (c
1
1) ≥ FAS (c
2
1). Since the preferences
list of each active nodes in V1 is updated in a way that c
1
1 moves to the first position
and c21 moves to the second position, and the active nodes in V2 do not affect the
rankings of c11 and c
2
1, we have thatFAS (c
1
1) = |AS∩V1| andFAS(c
2
1) = |V1\AS |.
Therefore, FAS (c
1
1) ≥ FAS (c
2
1) if and only if |AS ∩ V1| ≥ |V1 \ AS | = |V1| −
|V1 ∩ AS |, which means that |AS ∩ V1| ≥ |V1|/2.
– If j′ = 2 and i′ = 2, then we must have FAS(c
1
1) ≥ FAS(c
2
2). In this case, we
still have FAS(c
1
1) = |AS ∩ V1|, and, since c
2
2 is moved down by one position for
each active node in V2, then FAS (c
2
2) = |V2 \ AS |. This implies that FAS(c
1
1) ≥
FAS (c
2
2) if and only if |AS ∩ V1| ≥ |V2 \ AS | = |V2| − |V2 ∩ AS |, which means
|AS ∩ V1|+ |AS ∩ V2| ≥ |V2|.
– If j′ = 1 and i′ = 2, then we must have FAS (c
1
1) ≥ FAS(c
1
2). We again have
FAS (c
1
1) = |AS ∩ V1|, and, since c
1
2 is moved by one position up for each active
node in V2, thenFAS(c
1
2) = |AS∩V2|. Therefore,FAS (c
1
1) ≥ FAS (c
1
2) if and only
if |AS ∩ V1| ≥ |AS ∩ V2|.
Similar conditions hold for i = 2.
In order to elect candidate c11 we should have YAS (c
1
1) ≥ (t − 1)k = 2, which
means, we should find a seed set that satisfies at least two of the above conditions (or
the corresponding conditions to elect c12). Note that finding a seed set S of size at most
B that satisfies any pair of the above conditions is a NP -hard problem since it requires
to solve the IM problem, which is NP -hard even when the weight of all edges is 1 [17].
Let us assume that an optimal solution is able to elect both candidates in C1 (e.g. by
influencing |V1|/2 nodes from V1, and |V2|/2 nodes from V2), then the optimal MoVc
and DoWc are equal to 4 and 2, respectively. Moreover, in this case C
S
A
= CB = C2,
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then MoVc(C1, S) = F(C1, S)−F(C1, ∅)+F(C2, ∅)−F(C2, S). Since F(C2, ∅)−
F(C2, S) = F(C1, S)−F(C1, ∅), i.e., for each candidate lost by C2 there is a candi-
date gained by C1, then MoVc(C1, S) = 2(F(C1, S) − F(C1, ∅)) = 2DoWc(C1, S).
Since F(C1, ∅) = 0, any approximation algorithm for CDW or CMEC must find a
seed set S s.t. F(C1, S) > 0 and this requires to elect at least one candidate in C1 (see
Equation (1)), which is NP -hard. It follows that it is NP-hard to approximate CMEC
and CDW within any factor, as formally shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 1 It is NP-hard to approximate CMEC and CDW within any factor α > 0.
Proof. We reduce the decision version of the deterministic IM problem, to CMEC and
CDW, where deterministic refers to the weight of the edges, which is equal to 1. Let
us define the decision version of the IM problem as follows: Given a directed graph
G = (V,E) and budgetB ≤ |V |. Is there a set of seed nodes S ⊆ V such that |S| ≤ B
and AS = V ?
Let I(G,B) be a deterministic instance of the decision IM problem (then, using a
given seed set S, we can find the exact number of activated nodes in polynomial time).
We create an instance I ′(G′, B) of CMEC and CDW, whereG′ = (V ∪ V ′, E ∪ E′).
We use the same budget B for both problems. We first investigate the case where t =
3, k = 2, and consider two different cases as follows.
C1. If f(1) = f(2) = f(3) = a, f(4) = f(5) = f(6) = b for a, b ∈ R ∧ a > b ≥ 0,
we call this case exceptional, and do as follows.
For each v ∈ V we add one more node in V ′ and it has just one incoming edge
from v, i.e., ∀v ∈ V : v1 ∈ V ′, (v, v1) ∈ E′.
We set the preferences of all nodes v ∈ V and its new outgoing neighbor as follows:
v = (c21 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ c
3
1 ≻ c
1
1 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ c
3
2), v1 = (c
3
1 ≻ c
3
2 ≻ c
2
1 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ c
1
1 ≻ c
2
2) where
a ≻ b means a is preferred to b.
C2. For any non-increasing scoring function except the exceptional ones, we call it
general and do as follows.
For each v ∈ V we add three more nodes in V ′ and each of them has just one
incoming edge from v, i.e., ∀v ∈ V : v1, v2, v3 ∈ V ′, (v, v1), (v, v2), (v, v3) ∈ E′.
We set the preferences of all nodes v ∈ V and its new outgoing neighbors as
follows: v = (c21 ≻ c
1
1 ≻ c
3
1 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ c
3
2), v1 = (c
2
2 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ c
3
2 ≻ c
2
1 ≻ c
1
1 ≻
c31), v2 = (c
2
1 ≻ c
3
1 ≻ c
1
1 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ c
3
2 ≻ c
1
2), v3 = (c
2
2 ≻ c
3
2 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ c
2
1 ≻ c
3
1 ≻ c
1
1).
In both cases, the weight of all edges is 1, i.e., buv = 1 for all (u, v) ∈ E ∪ E′.
The score of candidates before any diffusion is as follows.
C1. F(c11, ∅) = F(c
1
2, ∅) = |V |(f(4) + f(5)) = 2b|V |, F(c
2
1, ∅) = F(c
3
1, ∅) =
|V |(f(1)+f(3)) = 2a|V |, F(c22, ∅) = F(c
3
2, ∅) = |V |(f(2)+f(6)) = (a+b)|V |.
Since a > b ≥ 0, it yields that F(C2, ∅) = F(C3, ∅) = 1, F(C1, ∅) = 0, and none
of our target candidates win the election.
C2. F(c11, ∅) = F(c
1
2, ∅) = |V |(f(2) + f(3) + f(5) + f(6)), F(c
2
1, ∅) = F(c
2
2, ∅) =
|V |(2f(1) + 2f(4)), F(c31, ∅) = F(c
3
2, ∅) = |V |(f(2) + f(3) + f(5) + f(6)).
Since f(·) is a non-increasing function, it yields F(C2, ∅) = 2 and F(C1, ∅) =
F(C3, ∅) = 0 and none of our target candidates win the election.
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In I ′(G′, B), in both cases, all of the nodes v ∈ V ∪V ′ become active if and only if
all of the nodes v ∈ V become active. Indeed, by definition, if V ⊆ AS , then for each
node u ∈ V ′ there exists an incoming neighbor v ∈ V s.t. (v, u) ∈ E′ and bvu = 1,
then if v is active, also u becomes active.
Suppose there exists an α−approximation algorithm called α-appAlg for CDW
(resp. CMEC) and it returns S ⊆ V ∪V ′ as a solution. We show that, by using the seed
nodes S returned by the algorithm α-appAlg, we can find the answer for the decision
IM problem. We will show that DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp. MoVc(C1, S) > 0) if and
only if S activates all of the nodes, i.e., AS = V ∪ V ′. That is DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp.
MoVc(C1, S) > 0) if and only if the answer to the decision IM problem is YES.
W.l.o.g., we assume S ⊆ V , because if there exists a node u ∈ S ∩ V ′, we can
replace it with the node v ∈ V s.t. (v, u) ∈ E′. Since buv = 1, this does not decrease
the value of DoWc(C1, S) or MoVc(C1, S).
We now show that if DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp. MoVc(C1, S) > 0), then AS =
V ∪ V ′. By contradiction, assume that S will not activate all of the nodes, i.e., there
exists a node v in V \AS . Then, the score of the candidates will be as follows.
C1. F(c11, S) = F(c
1
2, S) = |V |(f(4) + f(5)) ≤ (a+ b)(|V | − 1) + 2b, F(c
2
1, S) =
F(c31, S) = |V |(f(1) + f(3)) ≥ (a + b)(|V | − 1) + 2a, F(c
2
2, S) = F(c
3
2, S) =
|V |(f(2) + f(6)) = (a + b)|V |. Since a > b ≥ 0, then that none of the tar-
get candidates will be among the winners, i.e., F(C2, S) = F(C3, S) = 1 and
F(C1, S) = 0 and DoWc(C1, S) = MoVc(C1, S) = 0.
C2. F(c11, S) = F(c
1
2, S) ≤ (|V | − 1)(f(1)+ f(2)+ f(4)+ f(5)) + (f(2) + f(3)+
f(5) + f(6)), F(c21, S) = F(c
2
2, S) ≥ (|V | − 1)(f(1) + f(2) + f(4) + f(5)) +
(2f(1)+2f(4)),F(c31, S) = F(c
3
2, S) ≥ (|V |−1)(f(3)+f(4)+2f(6))+(f(2)+
f(3) + f(5) + f(6)). Since f(·) is a non-increasing function, then F(C1, S) =
F(C3, S) = 0 and F(C2, S) = 2. Therefore DoWc(C1, S) = MoVc(C1, S) = 0.
In both cases we have a contradiction. To show the other direction, if all of the nodes
become active, then the score of candidates will be as follows.
C1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, F(cji , S) = (a+b)|V |. Due to the tie-breaking
rule it follows that both of our target candidates will be among the winners, i.e.,
F(C1, S) = 2 and F(C2, S) = F(C3, S) = 0.
C2. F(c11, S) = F(c
1
2, S) = F(c
2
1, S) = F(c
2
2, S) = |V |(f(1)+f(2)+f(4)+f(5)),
F(c31, S) = F(c
3
2, S) = |V |(f(3) + f(4) + 2f(6)). Then, F(C1, S) = 2 and
F(C2, S) = F(C3, S) = 0.
Therefore we have DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp. MoVc(C1, S) > 0), and it concludes
the proof.
To generalize the proof for any k, t > 2, in constructive model using the general
non-increasing scoring function, we set the preferences lists of voters such that the dif-
ference between the number of winners from our target party before and after a diffusion
is exactly one, if and only if all of the nodes become active.
Consider the minimum j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |C| and f(i) > f(j), i.e., j is the
minimum rank that has less score than rank i = j−1. For example for plurality scoring
rule j = 2, and for anti-plurality j = |C|. Note that by assumption there exists such a
j. Let us define a, b as a = f(i), b = f(j).
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As in the case of t = 3 and k = 2, we provide a reduction from the decision version
of the deterministic IM problem, to CMEC and CDW. Let I(G,B) be an instance for
the decision IM problem, whereG = (V,E) andB, respectively, are the given directed
deterministic graph and budget for the IM problem. We create an instance I ′(G′, B)
for the general scoring rule CMEC and CDW, whereG′ = (V ∪V ′∪V ′′, E∪E′). We
consider the same budget, denoted by B for both problems. In order to createG′ we do
as follows.
– For each v ∈ V we add one more node in V ′ and it has just one incoming edge
from v, i.e., ∀v ∈ V : v1 ∈ V ′, (v, v1) ∈ E′. By default V ′′ is an empty set.
– The weight of all edges is 1, i.e., buv = 1 for all (u, v) ∈ E ∪ E′.
– We set the preferences of all nodes v ∈ V and its new outgoing neighbor as follows:
C1. If j ≤ k. In this case, for each node v ∈ V we add 2α isolated nodes to the
graph where α = ⌈k−1
i
⌉. Formally, the graph will beG′ = (V ∪V ′ ∪V ′′, E ∪
E′) where for each node v ∈ V we have v2, v3, . . . , vα+1, v′2, v
′
3, . . . , v
′
α+1 ∈
V ′′. For simplicity, let us define k′ = k− 1. Also, V, V ′, E, and E′ are defined
as before. Note that nodes v ∈ V ′′ do not have any incoming or outgoing edge.
We set the preferences of all nodes as follows.
v : c11 ≻ c
1
2 · · · ≻ c
1
i−1 ≻
i
↓
c21 ≻
j
↓
c1k ≻ c
3
1 ≻ c
1
i ≻ c
1
i+1 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
k−1 ≻ . . . ;
v1 : c
2
1 ≻ c
1
i ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
2i−2 ≻
j
↓
c31 ≻
j+1
↓
c1k ≻ c
1
1 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
i−1 ≻ c
1
2i−1 ≻
· · · ≻ c1k−1 ≻ . . . ;
v2 : c
1
1 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c1i ≻
j
↓
c1k ≻ c
2
1 ≻ c
1
j ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
k−1 ≻ . . . ;
v′2 : c
1
1 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c1i ≻
j
↓
c21 ≻ c
1
k ≻ c
1
j ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
k−1 ≻ . . . ;
v3 : c
1
i%k′+1 ≻ c
1
(i+1)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c1(2i−1)%k′+1 ≻
j
↓
c1k ≻
c21 ≻ c
1
(2i)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
(i+k′−1)%k′+1 ≻ . . . ;
v′3 : c
1
i%k′+1 ≻ c
1
(i+1)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c1(2i−1)%k′+1 ≻
j
↓
c21 ≻
c1k ≻ c
1
(2i)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
(i+k′−1)%k′+1 ≻ . . . ;
v4 : c
1
2i%k′+1 ≻ c
1
(2i+1)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c1(3i−1)%k′+1 ≻
j
↓
c1k ≻
c21 ≻ c
1
(3i)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
(2i+k′−1)%k′+1 ≻ . . . ;
v′4 : c
1
2i%k′+1 ≻ c
1
(2i+1)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c1(3i−1)%k′+1 ≻
j
↓
c21 ≻
c1k ≻ c
1
(3i)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
(2i+k′−1)%k′+1 ≻ . . . ;
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...
vα+1 : c
1
((α−1)i)%k′+1 ≻ c
1
((α−1)i+1)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c1(αi−1)%k′+1 ≻
j
↓
c1k ≻
c21 ≻ c
1
(αi)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
((α−1)i+k′−1)%k′+1 ≻ . . . ;
v′α+1 : c
1
((α−1)i)%k′+1 ≻ c
1
((α−1)i+1)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c1(αi−1)%k′+1 ≻
j
↓
c21 ≻
c1k ≻ c
1
(αi)%k′+1 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
((α−1)i+k′−1)%k′+1 ≻ . . . .
In this case, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 all the candidates ci ∈ C1, c21 ∈ C2 have more
votes than c1k; also, every other candidates has at most the same score of c
1
k.
Hence, F(C1, ∅) = k − 1,F(C2, ∅) = 1, for all 3 ≤ j ≤ t,F(Cj , ∅) = 0.
C2. If k < j < |C|.
v : c11 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
k−1 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ · · · ≻ c
2
k ≻ c
3
1 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c21 ≻
j
↓
c1k ≻ . . . ;
v1 : c
1
1 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
k−1 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ · · · ≻ c
2
k ≻ · · · ≻
j
↓
c31 ≻
j+1
↓
c1k ≻ . . . .
Also in this case, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 all the candidates ci ∈ C1, c21 ∈ C2 have
more votes than c1k; and every other candidates has at most the same score of
c1k. Hence, F(C1, ∅) = k − 1,F(C2, ∅) = 1, for all 3 ≤ j ≤ t,F(Cj , ∅) = 0.
C3. If j = |C|. In this case, we add an extra candidate called ct+11 to the candidates
(C = C ∪ {ct+11 }), and then we set the preferences list as follows:
v : c11 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
k−1 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ · · · ≻ c
2
k ≻ c
3
1 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c21 ≻
j
↓
c1k ≻ c
t+1
1 ;
v1 : c
1
1 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
k−1 ≻ c
2
1 ≻ · · · ≻ c
2
k ≻ · · · ≻
j
↓
ct+11 ≻
j+1
↓
c1k .
The extra candidate will not be among winners before and after any diffusion.
We just add it to the candidates to be able to put the candidate c1k ∈ C1 in
position j + 1.
By this reduction, before any diffusion, in all cases, k − 1 winner will be from our
target part C1, and one winner from party C2.
In I ′(G′, B), concerning all cases, all of the nodes v ∈ V ∪ V ′ become active if
and only if all of the nodes v ∈ V become active. Indeed, by definition, if V ⊆ AS ,
then for each node u ∈ V ′ there exists an incoming neighbor v ∈ V s.t. (v, u) ∈ E′
and bvu = 1, then if v is active, also u becomes active.
Suppose there exists an α−approximation algorithm called α-appAlg for CDW
(respectively, CMEC) and it returns S ⊆ V ∪ V ′ ∪ V ′′ as a solution. We show that, by
using the seed nodes S returned by the algorithm α-appAlg, we can find the answer for
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the decision IM problem. We will show that DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp. MoVc(C1, S) >
0) if and only if S activates all of the nodes in V ∪ V ′, i.e., AS = V ∪ V ′, where AS is
the set of activated nodes after S. That is, since G is a subgraph of (V ∪ V ′, E ∪ E′),
then DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (respectively, MoVc(C1, S) > 0) if and only if the answer to
the decision IM problem is YES.
In order to show if DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp. MoVc(C1, S) > 0), then S activates
all of the nodes in V ∪ V ′, i.e., V ∪ V ′ ⊆ AS , first we show that by S′ ⊂ V ∪ V ′ ∪ V ′′
returned by α-appAlg, we can find a new seed nodes S ⊆ V s.t. DoWc(C1, S′) =
DoWc(C1, S) (also MoVc(C1, S
′) = MoVc(C1, S)). We construct S as follows:
– All of the nodes u ∈ S′ ∩ V will be in the S as well.
– For all of the nodes u ∈ S′ ∩ V ′, we replace them with their single incoming
neighbor, i.e., we replace u with the node v ∈ V s.t. (v, u) ∈ E′. In this case, the
target candidate will get at least the same score as before.
– If the algorithm selects a node v ∈ V ′′ (in case C1), for all of the nodes u ∈
S′ ∩ V ′′, if there exists an isolated node v ∈ V \ S′, we replace u with v in
the S, i.e., we replace u with an arbitrary node in {w | w ∈ V \ S′, ∀v′ ∈ V :
(v′, w) /∈ E ∧ (w, v′) /∈ E}; if the set is empty, then we replace u with an arbitrary
node in {w | w ∈ V \ S′}; since B ≤ |V |, then the set cannot be empty. In the
following, we show that by using this substitution, we will get the same value for
both DoWc(C1, S
′) and DoWc(C1, S). Let us consider the following cases:
• The algorithm selected u while there exists an isolated node v ∈ V , i.e., there
exists a node v ∈ V \S′ which does not have any incoming or outgoing neigh-
bor in V ; in this case, we replace u with v in the seed nodes S, and the target
candidate gets the same score as before. Then DoWc(C1, S
′) ≤ DoWc(C1, S)
(also MoVc(C1, S
′) ≤ MoVc(C1, S)).
• The algorithm selected u ∈ V ′′ as a seed node in S′, because all of the nodes
v ∈ V ∪ V ′ will be activated by the seed nodes S′′ = S′ \ {u}. In this
case, since it is enough to activate all nodes of V ∪ V ′ to get the maximum
value for DoWc (resp. MoVc), then if we even remove the node u from the
seed nodes, it still will activate all nodes of V ∪ V ′, and DoWc(C1, S′) =
DoWc(C1, S) (resp. MoVc(C1, S
′) = MoVc(C1, S)). By the way, we re-
place u with v ∈ V \ S′ in the seed nodes S, but DoWc(C1, S) will be the
same as DoWc(C1, S
′) (because in this case, DoWc(C1, S
′) has the maximum
value by activating all nodes v ∈ V ∪ V ′, and S activates them too), then
DoWc(C1, S) = DoWc(C1, S
′). In other words, if the algorithm can activate
all of the nodes v ∈ V then all of the target candidates will win the election.
Note that it is not possible to have a node u ∈ V ′′ ∪ S′ and a node v ∈ V \ AS′
where v is not isolated, at the same time; because, if there exists such a node v,
α-appAlg could replace u with v (or the incoming neighbor of v) and increases the
score of its target candidate with the same budget.
Then, from now on, we assume that α-appAlg returns the seed nodes S, s.t. S ∈ V .
Now we show that if DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp. MoVc(C1, S) > 0), then S activates all
of the nodes in V ∪ V ′, i.e., AS = V ∪ V ′. By contradiction, assume S is a solution for
the problem s.t. DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp. MoVc(C1, S) > 0), and S does not activate
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all nodes of V ∪V ′, i.e., there exists a node v s.t. v ∈ V \AS . In this case, for the score
of candidates, for all cases, according to the preferences lists, the candidate c11 will have
at least a− b score less than candidates c12, . . . , c
1
k, c
2
1, which meansF(C1, S) = k− 1.
According to the definition of DoWc we have DoWc(C1, S) = 0 (also,MoVc(C1, S) =
0), which is a contradiction. On the other hand, to show that if S activates all the nodes
V ∪V ′, then DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp. MoVc(C1, S) > 0), note that if all nodes V ∪V ′
become active, the score of all candidates c ∈ C1 will be more than or equal to all
other candidates. Then by using the tie breaking rule, F(C1, S) = k, and 2 ≤ n ≤ t :
F(Cn, S) = 0, which yields DoWc(C1, S) > 0 (resp. MoVc(C1, S) > 0). Then, on
one side, if S is an answer to the DMEC or DDW, it activates all 2n nodes in V ∪ V ′.
On the other side, sinceG is subgraph of (V ∪V ′, E∪E′), and S ⊆ V , then S activates
all nodes in G. ⊓⊔
Destructive Election Control. The following theorem shows the hardness of approx-
imation of the destructive case. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, and hence
it is omitted. Note that if we consider maximizing DoWd, the destructive case can be
reduced to the constructive model. We cannot apply the same reduction to the problem
of maximizing MoVd as the opponent party with the highest number of winners (i.e.,
CB, C
S
A
) may be different from that of the constructive case.
Theorem 2 It is NP -hard to approximate DMEC and DDW within any factor α > 0.
4 Straight-Party Voting
Since all the variants of the multi-winner election control problems considered so far
are NP-hard to be approximated within any factor, we now consider a relaxation of
the problem in which, instead of focusing on the number of elected target candidates,
we focus on the overall number of votes obtained by the target party. The rationale is
that, even if a party is not able to (approximately) maximize the number of its winning
candidates because it is computationally unattainable, it may want to maximize the
overall number of votes, in the hope that these are not too spread among the candidates
and still leads to a large number of seats in the parliament.
Moreover, the voting system that we obtain by the relaxation is used in some real
parliamentary elections [22], and is called of Straight-party voting (SPV) or straight-
ticket voting [7,19]. SPV was used very much until around the 1960s and 1970s in
the United States. After that, the United States has declined SPV; nevertheless, strong
partisans have remained SPV voters. Every state voting for a Democrat for Senate
also voted Republicans for president in 2016 elections; the same stability was true for
Democratic [16].
Note that in this model, if we consider that the controller targets a single candidate
instead of a party and the preference lists are over candidates, then we can easily re-
duce the problem to the single-winner case. The same holds if the controller targets a
party and the preference lists are over parties. Therefore, we assume that voters have
preference lists over the candidates, but since the voting system is SPV and voters have
to vote for a party, then they will cast a vote for each party based on the position of
the candidates of the party in their preferences list, e.g., if the preferences list of a node
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v ∈ V is c11 ≻ c
2
1 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ c
1
2, then the scores of v for party C1 will be f(1) + f(4), and
f(2) + f(3) for party C2.
Let us define Fspv(Ci, ∅) and Fspv(Ci, S) as sum of the scores obtained by party
Ci in SPV before and after S, respectively, as follows.
Fspv(Ci, ∅) =
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈Ci
f(πv(c)), Fspv(Ci, S) = E
[∑
v∈V
∑
c∈Ci
f(π˜v(c))
]
.
As in the previous case, we denote by CB and C
S
A
the most voted opponents of C1
before and after S, respectively. We define MoVc and MoVd for SPV as
MoVspvc (C1, S) = Fspv(C1, S)−Fspv(C
S
A
, S)− (Fspv(C1, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)) ,
MoV
spv
d (C1, S) = Fspv(C1, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)−
(
Fspv(C1, S)−Fspv(C
S
A
, S)
)
.
Also, we define Difference of votes for constructive (DoVc) and destructive (DoVd) as
DoVspvc (C1, S) = Fspv(C1, S)−Fspv(C1, ∅),
DoV
spv
d (C1, S) = Fspv(C1, ∅)− Fspv(C1, S).
Theorem 3 Maximizing MoV and DoV in the constructive and destructive SPV prob-
lems is NP -hard.
Proof. As in Theorem 1, we use the decision version of the deterministic IM problem.
Let I(G,B) be a deterministic instance of the decision IM problem. We create an in-
stance I ′(G′, B) of SPV , whereG′ = G and B is the same budget for both problems.
Assume t = k = 2, and we are using a non-increasing scoring function. Consider the
minimum j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |C| and f(i) > f(j), i.e., j is the minimum rank
that has less score than rank i = j − 1. Note that 2 ≤ j ≤ 4. We set the preferences list
of each voter v ∈ V in graphG′ as follows.
C1. If j = 2. v : c21 ≻ c
1
1 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ c
2
2. In this case, Fspv(C1, ∅) = (f(2) + f(3))|V |.
C2. If j = 3. v : c21 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ c
1
1 ≻ c
1
2. In this case, Fspv(C1, ∅) = (f(3) + f(4))|V |.
C3. If j = 4. v : c11 ≻ c
2
1 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ c
1
2. In this case, Fspv(C1, ∅) = (f(1) + f(4))|V |.
By this preferences assignment, if all of the nodes become active after S, then the score
and DoVspvc for party C1 will be as following.
C1. Fspv(C1, S) = (f(1) + f(2))|V |,
DoVspvc (C1, S) = (f(1) + f(2))|V | − (f(2) + f(3))|V |
= (f(1)− f(3))|V |;
and, if at least one node is not active DoVspvc (C1, S) < (f(1)− f(3))|V |.
C2. Fspv(C1, S) = (f(2) + f(3))|V |,
DoVspvc (C1, S) = (f(2) + f(3))|V | − (f(3) + f(4))|V |
= (f(2)− f(4))|V |;
also, if at least one node is not active DoVspvc (C1, S) < (f(2)− f(4))|V |.
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C3. Fspv(C1, S) = (f(1) + f(3))|V |,
DoVspvc (C1, S) = (f(1) + f(3))|V | − (f(1) + f(4))|V |
= (f(3)− f(4))|V |;
moreover, if at least one node is not active DoVspvc (C1, S) < (f(3)− f(4))|V |.
Then by this reduction, we can distinguish between the case that all of the nodes be-
come active or not, which is the answer of IM problem. In this case, since there are
just two parties, then whatever C2 looses will go for C1. Then, MoV
spv
c (C1, S) =
2DoVspvc (C1, S), which means we also can answer to IM problem by maximizing
MoVspvc .
Now, let us generalize the proof for any k, t > 2, regarding the constructive model
and general non-increasing scoring function. The idea is the same as before, and we
need to set the preferences list of the voters such that at least one of the candidates
changes the score of the target party C1 if the node becomes active. For example, as-
sume the scoring function is plurality, and we set the preferences lists of all nodes
as c21 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ . . . . Then score of C1 will be the same, before and after any diffu-
sion; hence we cannot distinguish between them. But, if we set the preferences list as
c21 ≻ c
1
1 ≻ . . . , the score of C1 before and after a diffusion process will change as much
as the number of activated nodes after the process.
We consider i, j with the same definition, and assume I(G,B) is an instance for
the decision IM problem, whereG = (V,E) and B are the given directed deterministic
graph and budget, respectively.We create I ′(G′, B) as an instance forMoVc and DoVc,
where G′ = G, and the same budget, denoted by B, for both problems. To create the
preferences list of the nodes in G′ we do as follows.
C1. If j ≤ k. v : c21 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ · · · ≻
i
↓
c2i ≻
j
↓
c11 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
k ≻ c
2
j ≻ . . . . In this case,
Fspv(C1, ∅) = |V |
∑
j≤l<j+k f(l).
C2. If j > k. v : c11 ≻ c
1
2 ≻ · · · ≻ c
1
k−1 ≻ c
2
1 ≻ c
2
2 ≻ · · · ≻
j
↓
c1k ≻ . . . . In this case,
Fspv(C1, ∅) = (a(k − 1) + b)|V |.
By this preferences assignment, if all of the nodes become active after S, then Fspv and
DoVspvc for party C1 will be as following.
C1. Fspv(C1, S) = |V |
∑
i≤l<i+k f(l),
DoVspvc (C1, S) = |V |
∑
i≤l<i+k
f(l)− |V |
∑
j≤l<j+k
f(l)
= (f(i)− f(i+ k))|V |;
and, if at least one node is not active DoVspvc (C1, S) < (f(i)− f(i+ k))|V |.
C2. Fspv(C1, S) = ak|V |,
DoVspvc (C1, S) = ak|V | − (a(k − 1) + b)|V |
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= (a− b)|V |;
also, if at least one node is not active DoVspvc (C1, S) < (a− b)|V |.
Then by this reduction, we can distinguish between the case that all of the nodes become
active or not, which is the answer of IM problem. RegardingMoVspvc , if all of the nodes
v ∈ V become active we have:
C1. In this case, the party with the most score before and after any diffusion process
is C2. Then if all of the nodes become active after a diffusion, the score of C2 will
reduce by (f(i)− f(i+ k))|V |. In other words, whatever C2 loses will add to C1;
then MoVspvc (C1, S) = 2DoV
spv
c (C1, S).
C2. In this case, we have two different situations as follows.
C2.1. If j ≤ 2k; then the party with most score before and after any diffusion is
C2. Similar to case C1, MoV
spv
c (C1, S) = 2DoV
spv
c (C1, S).
C2.2. If 2k < j; the party with the most score before and after S is still C2,
but the score of C2 will not reduce after any diffusion, i.e., MoV
spv
c (C1, S) =
Fspv(C1, S)−Fspv(CSA , S)−(Fspv(C1, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)) = ak|V |−ak|V |−(
(a(k − 1) + b)|V |)− ak|V |
)
= (a− b)|V |.
Note that if there exists at least one inactive node in G′ after S, then the value of
MoVspvc (C1, S) will be less than what is determined above. By this, we can understand
if all of the nodes can be activated by a set of seed nodes S, which is the answer of IM
problem.
To present a reduction from the deterministic and decision version of IM problem
to DoVd and MoVd, it is very similar to the constructive model. Except that we should
set the preferences list of the nodes v ∈ V such that at least one of the candidates
c ∈ C1 can decrease the score of C1. The same approach proves the NP-hardness of
destructive model too. ⊓⊔
We now give an approximation algorithm for the problems of maximizing DoVspvc
and DoV
spv
d that is based on a reduction to the node-weighted version of the IM problem
We construct an instance of this problem where the weight to each node v ∈ V , which
is equal to the increase in the score of C1 when v becomes active. The node-weighted
IM problem can be approximated by a factor of 1 − 1
e
− ǫ, for any ǫ > 0, by using the
standard greedy algorithm [17].
Theorem 4 There exists an algorithm that approximates DoVspvc and DoV
spv
d within a
factor (1− 1
e
)− ǫ from the optimum, for any ǫ > 0.
Proof. We first consider the constructive case, i.e., DoVspvc . Let us define C¯
v
1 ⊆ C1
as a set of candidates in our target party whose rank is decreased if v become active;
in other words, C¯v1 = {c ∈ C1 : ∃c
′ ∈ C \ C1, πv(c′) < πv(c)}. In this case, a
node v ∈ V can increase the score of C1 by
∑
c∈C¯v
1
f(πv(c) − 1)− f(πv(c)).2 Given
2 We assume function f(·) is defined in such away that f(i− 1)− f(i), for i = 2, . . . ,m, does
not depend exponentially on the graph size (e.g. it is a constant). The influence maximization
problem with arbitrary node-weights is still an open problem [17].
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an instance of I(G,B) of the DoVspvc maximization problem, we define an instance
I ′(G,B,w) of the node-weighted IM problem, where w is a node-weight function
defined as w(v) =
∑
c∈C¯v
1
(f(πv(c)− 1)− f(πv(c))) , for all v ∈ V . Given a set S of
nodes, we denote by σ(S) the expected weight of active nodes inG, when the diffusion
starts from S. We will show that DoVspvc (C1, S) = σ(S) for any set S ⊆ V , since
the standard greedy algorithm guarantees an approximation factor of 1− 1
e
− ǫ, for the
node-weight IM problem, for any ǫ > 0, this shows the statement.
Given a set S, σ(S) can be computed as follows:
σ(S) = EAS
[ ∑
v∈AS
w(v)
]
=
∑
AS⊆V
∑
v∈AS
w(v)P(AS),
where P(AS) is the probability that AS ⊆ V is the set of nodes activated by S.
By definition DoVspvc (C1, S) = Fspv(C1, S)−Fspv(C1, ∅), where Fspv(C1, ∅) =∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C1
f(πv(c)) and
Fspv(C1, S) = EAS
[∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C1
f(π˜v(c))
]
=
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C1
EAS [f(π˜v(c))]
=
∑
v∈V

∑
c∈C¯v
1
EAS [f(π˜v(c))] +
∑
c∈C1\C¯v1
f(πv(c))

 ,
where the last equality is due to the fact that, a node v doesn’t change the positions of
candidates in C1 \ C¯v1 . Let us focus on the first term of the above formula,∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C¯v
1
EAS [f(π˜v(c))]
=
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C¯v
1
∑
AS⊆V
(f(πv(c)− 1)1v∈As + f(πv(c))1v 6∈As)P(AS)
=
∑
AS⊆V

∑
v∈AS
∑
c∈C¯v
1
f(πv(c)− 1) +
∑
v 6∈AS
∑
c∈C¯v
1
f(πv(c))

P(AS).
It follows that
DoVspvc (C1, S) =
∑
v∈V
∑
c∈C¯v
1
EAS [f(π˜v(c)) − f(πv(c))]
∑
AS⊆V
∑
v∈AS
∑
c∈C¯v
1
(f(πv(c)− 1)− f(πv(c)))P(AS) = σ(S),
since the term related to candidates in C1 \ C¯v1 and to nodes not inAS are canceled out.
The destructive case is similar to the constructive one except that a node v ∈ V
can decrease the score of C1 by
∑
c∈C1:∃c′∈C\C1,πv(c′)>πv(c)
f(πv(c))−f(πv(c)+1).
Therefore the same approach, where the weights are set to the above value, yields the
same approximation factor for DoV
spv
d . ⊓⊔
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In the following theorems, we show that using Theorem 4, we get a constant ap-
proximation factor for the problem of maximizing MoV. Specifically, we show that
by maximizing DoVspvc we get an extra 1/3 approximation factor for the problem of
maximizing MoVspvc . For the destructive case, the extra approximation factor is 1/2. It
follows that, by using the greedy algorithm for maximizing DoVspvc and DoV
spv
d , we
obtain approximation factors of 13 (1 −
1
e
) − ǫ and 12 (1 −
1
e
) − ǫ, for any ǫ > 0, of the
maximum MoVspvc and MoV
spv
d , respectively.
Theorem 5 There exists an algorithm that approximates MoVspvc within a factor
1
3 (1−
1
e
)− ǫ from the optimum, for any ǫ > 0.
Proof. Let S and S∗ be the solution returned by the greedy algorithm for DoVspvc max-
imization and a solution that maximizesMoVspvc , respectively. For each partyCi 6= C1,
we denote by DoV−c (Ci, S) the score lost by Ci after S, that is DoV
−
c (Ci, S) =
F(Ci, ∅) − F(Ci, S) ≥ 0. Let αǫ := (1 −
1
e
) − ǫ. Since S is a factor αǫ from the
optimum DoVspvc , the following holds.
MoVspvc (C1, S) = Fspv(C1, S)−Fspv(C
S
A
, S)−
(
Fspv(C1, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)
)
= DoVspvc (C1, S) + DoV
−
c (C
S
A
, S)−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅) + Fspv(CB, ∅)
≥ αǫDoV
spv
c (C1, S
∗)−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅) + Fspv(CB, ∅)
(a)
≥
1
3
αǫ
[
DoVspvc (C1, S
∗) + DoV−c (C
S∗
A
, S∗) + DoV−c (C
S
A
, S∗)
]
−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅) + Fspv(CB, ∅)
(b)
≥
1
3
αǫ
[
DoVspvc (C1, S
∗) + DoV−c (C
S∗
A
, S∗) + DoV−c (C
S
A
, S∗)
−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅) + Fspv(CB, ∅) + Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅)−Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅)
]
=
1
3
αǫ
[
MoVspvc (C1, S
∗) + DoV−c (C
S
A
, S∗) + Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅)−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)
]
(c)
≥
1
3
αǫMoV
spv
c (C1, S
∗) ≥
(
1
3
(
1−
1
e
)
− ǫ
)
MoVspvc (C1, S
∗),
for any ǫ > 0. Inequality (a) holds because, by definition, the score lost by CS
A
and
CS
∗
A
will be added to the score of C1. Inequality (b) holds since, by definition of CB,
Fspv(CB, ∅) ≥ Fspv(CSA , ∅) and then −Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅) +Fspv(CB, ∅) ≥ 0. Inequality (c)
holds because
DoV−c (C
S∗
A
, S∗)− DoV−c (C
S
A
, S∗)
= Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅)−Fspv(C
S∗
A
, S∗)−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅) + Fspv(C
S
A
, S∗)
(d)
≤ Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅)−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅),
which implies that
DoV−c (C
S
A
, S∗) + Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅)−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅) ≥ DoV−c (C
S∗
A
, S∗) ≥ 0.
Inequality (d) holds since, by definition of CS
∗
A
, F(CS
A
, S∗) ≤ F(CS
∗
A
, S∗). ⊓⊔
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Theorem 6 There exists an algorithm that approximates MoV
spv
d within a factor
1
2 (1−
1
e
)− ǫ from the optimum, for any ǫ > 0.
Proof. Let S and S∗ be the solution returned by the greedy algorithm for DoVspvd maxi-
mization and a solution that maximizes MoV
spv
d , respectively. For each party Ci 6= C1,
we denote by DoV+c (Ci, S) the score gained by Ci after S, that is DoV
+
c (Ci, S) =
F(Ci, S) − F(Ci, ∅) ≥ 0. Let αǫ := (1 −
1
e
) − ǫ. Since S is a factor αǫ from the
optimum DoVspvc , the following holds.
MoV
spv
d (C1, S) = Fspv(C1, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)−
(
Fspv(C1, S)−Fspv(C
S
A
, S)
)
= DoVspvd (C1, S) + DoV
+
c (C
S
A
, S) + Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)
≥ αǫDoV
spv
d (C1, S
∗) + DoV+c (C
S
A
, S) + Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)
(a)
≥
1
2
αǫ
[
DoV
spv
d (C1, S
∗) + DoV+c (C
S∗
A
, S∗)
]
+ DoV+c (C
S
A
, S)+
Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)
(b)
≥
1
2
αǫ
[
DoV
spv
d (C1, S
∗) + DoV+c (C
S∗
A
, S∗) + DoV+c (C
S
A
, S)+
Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅) + Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅)−Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅)
]
=
1
2
αǫ
[
MoVd(C1, S
∗) + DoV+c (C
S
A
, S)−Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅) + Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)
]
(c)
≥
1
2
αǫMoVd(C1, S
∗) ≥
(
1
2
(
1−
1
e
)
− ǫ
)
MoVd(C1, S
∗),
for any ǫ > 0. Inequality (a) holds because CS
∗
A
can gain at most all of the scores lost
by C1. Inequality (b) holds since we have
DoV+c (C
S
A
, S) + Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)
= Fspv(C
S
A
, S)−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅) + Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)−Fspv(CB, ∅)
= Fspv(C
S
A
, S)−Fspv(CB, ∅),
and, by definition of CS
A
, Fspv(CSA , S) ≥ Fspv(CB, S) ≥ Fspv(CB, ∅). Inequality (c)
holds because
DoV+c (C
S
A
, S)−Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅) + Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)
= Fspv(C
S
A
, S)−Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)−Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅) + Fspv(C
S
A
, ∅)
= Fspv(C
S
A
, S)−Fspv(C
S∗
A
, ∅)
and, by definition of CS
A
, Fspv(CSA , S) ≥ Fspv(C
S∗
A
, S) ≥ Fspv(CS
∗
A
, ∅). ⊓⊔
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Controlling elections through social networks is a significant issue in modern society.
Political campaigns are using social networks as effective tools to influence voters in
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real-life elections. In this paper, we formalized the multi-winner election control prob-
lem through social influence. We proved that finding an approximation to the maximum
margin of victory or difference of winners, for both constructive and destructive cases,
is NP-hard for any approximation factor. We relaxed the problem to a variation of
straight-party voting and showed that this case is approximable within a constant factor
in both constructive and destructive cases. To our knowledge, these are the first results
on multi-winner election control via social influence.
The results in this paper open several research directions. We plan to study the prob-
lem in which the adversary can spread a different (constructive/destructive)message for
each candidate, using different seed nodes. In these cases, a good strategy could be that
of sending a message regarding a third party (different from the target one and the most
voted opponent), and our results cannot be easily extended.
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